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12 **SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA**

13 **FOR THE COUNTY OF ORANGE**

14
15 AHMED D. HUSSEIN,

16 Plaintiff,

17 vs.

18 SHELDON RAZIN, STEVEN PLOCHOCKI,
19 QUALITY SYSTEMS, INC. and DOES 1-10,
Inclusive,

20 Defendants.

Case No. 30-2013-00679600-CU-NP-CJC

*Assigned For All Purposes To:
Judge Glenn Salter*

**PLAINTIFF AHMED D. HUSSEIN'S
TRIAL BRIEF**

Date: July 6, 2021
Time: 9:00 a.m.
Dept.: C22

Action Filed: October 4, 2013
Trial Date: November 6, 2020

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1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 Plaintiff Ahmed Hussein has waited almost eight years for the opportunity to present his
3 fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and constructive fraud claims to a jury and receive his long
4 overdue justice for the tremendous harm he suffered at Defendants' hands. After completely
5 defeating QSI's baseless breach of fiduciary duty claim against Hussein in 2017, and getting a
6 unanimous reversal of Judge Schulte's initial order granting Defendants' motion for summary
7 judgment on Hussein's claims from the Court of Appeal in 2019, Hussein is eager to present his
8 claims to a jury so that he may recover the more than \$400 million he lost due to Defendants'
9 wrongful conduct.

10 In 2011 and 2012, defendants Sheldon Razin and Steve Plochocki orchestrated a scheme to
11 portray the company's financial foundation as rock solid. In a series of board presentations, public
12 statements, and direct statements to Hussein, Defendants asserted the company had a sales pipeline
13 that was continuing to grow to record levels, that it expected to grow revenues at 20-24% and
14 earnings at as much as 30% or more in its 2013 fiscal year, which began in April 2012. Those
15 statements were a complete fabrication and concealed the fact that Defendants in fact had *no basis*
16 for their projections, knew their business was slowing down, and were desperate to portray the
17 company's situation favorably in order to entrench themselves and profit from QSI's then sky-high
18 stock prices.

19 Unfortunately, Hussein believed what QSI management said and had no knowledge about
20 the truth being concealed, and he therefore reversed plans to sell his QSI stock, as he had taken
21 steps to do since the fall of 2011 and through early 2012. Instead, Hussein pursued a proxy contest
22 to seek the election of an independent board and the institution of what he viewed as long-needed
23 corporate governance reforms. Based on Defendants' statements, Hussein believed that effort
24 would be successful, and that the company would achieve unprecedented heights. But the value of
25 Hussein's investment in the company was destroyed on July 26, 2012, when Razin and Plochocki—
26 unilaterally and without notice to or approval by the company's board, and contrary to what had
27 been represented to Hussein, the board, and the investing public until the very eve of that
28 announcement—withdrawed the projections, leading QSI's stock price to drop by an additional 30%

1 in a single day. Based on the stock price he would have realized had Defendants’ representations
2 been true, *which is the same price at which Defendant Plochocki himself unloaded his QSI shares*
3 *while the frauds were ongoing*, Hussein’s damages exceed \$400 million.

4 Hussein’s claims fall squarely under those expressly permitted under California law by the
5 Supreme Court in *Small v. Fritz*, 30 Cal. 4th 167 (2003), which held that companies do not receive
6 a free pass when they defraud their shareholders by inducing them not to sell company stock. *Id.* at
7 190. In doing so, the Supreme Court made clear that “California has long acknowledged that if the
8 effect of a misrepresentation is to induce forbearance—to induce persons not to take action—and
9 those persons are damaged as a result, they have a cause of action for fraud.” *Id.* There is no
10 “exception to this rule when the forbearance is to refrain from selling stock.” *Id.* The Supreme
11 Court therefore expressly acknowledged that holder’s claims fit within a long line of common law
12 fraud cases appropriately brought under California law.

13 At all relevant times, Hussein was QSI’s second largest shareholder. After spending years
14 tirelessly attempting to improve QSI’s business and enhance its corporate governance, in 2011
15 Hussein started taking steps to exit his position and move away from the company and its founder
16 as they continued to target and harass Hussein in direct violation of California and corporate law.
17 Hussein started working closely with an experienced trader who would be able to assist Hussein in
18 selling his 9.33 million QSI shares while it was trading at almost \$50 per share. Absent Defendants’
19 representations and omissions, that sale would have been completed in February 2012, shortly after
20 QSI accurately announced record revenue and earnings for the prior quarter. In the middle of
21 Hussein’s work towards that sale, however, Defendants made a series of concrete projections
22 regarding QSI’s short-term revenue and earnings growth prospects and the status of its sales
23 pipeline. In hours-long presentations at company board meetings in October 2011 and 2012, in
24 public statements, and directly to Hussein, Plochocki and QSI’s management team depicted a
25 company that was poised for a period of phenomenal future growth at levels far higher even than it
26 had achieved thus far. Throughout, Defendants concealed the fact that QSI’s pipeline was
27 shrinking, its projections were jerry-rigged to fuel Razin’s demands for growth in excess of 2012,
28 and it was not in fact securing the long-term contracts needed to sustain its historical levels of

1 revenue and earnings growth. Together, Defendants’ misstatement and omissions convinced
2 Hussein to step back from selling his stock so that he could benefit from QSI’s robust growth on
3 the near horizon.

4 Defendants’ projections were not mere puffery or vague pronouncements regarding an
5 amorphous future. No, as the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals already determined when reviewing
6 the corresponding securities class action involving many of the identical statements at issue here,
7 “Plochocki and the others did not just describe the pipeline in subjective or emotive terms. Rather,
8 they provided a concrete description of the past and present state of the pipeline. . . . Plochocki . . .
9 reassured them that the pipeline was full and growing. These statements ‘affirmatively create[d] an
10 impression of a state of affairs that differ[ed] in a material way from the one that actually
11 exist[ed].’” *In re Quality Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig.*, 865 F.3d 1130, 1144 (9th Cir. 2017).

12 Unfortunately for Hussein, the material representations he relied upon in holding his QSI
13 stock were totally baseless, as revealed when the truth partially came out on July 26, 2012. That’s
14 when QSI announced the results for the first quarter of its 2013 fiscal year. Plochocki revealed that
15 QSI’s net income for the first quarter of fiscal 2013 had declined by 18% from the prior year, and
16 QSI retracted the revenue and earnings guidance it had just recently issued and reaffirmed.
17 Although the Board met on July 25, 2012, the Board was not informed of, and never authorized,
18 this extreme retraction. In presentations to the board, QSI management continued to confirm and
19 reconfirm the company’s projections right through the July 25 board meeting. Hussein and the QSI
20 board were not informed that QSI management had been fabricating the financial projections for
21 months, and were not provided any opportunity to fulfill their responsibility as directors to address
22 the situation before Razin and management unilaterally withdrew the projections. QSI’s retraction
23 of the revenue and earnings guidance it had been affirming for months shocked the market. QSI’s
24 stock price plunged from \$23.63 per share to \$15.95 per share, a one-day drop of 32% that erased
25 hundreds of millions of dollars from the Company’s market value and caused Hussein tens of
26 millions of dollars in damages on shares of his stock that he was forced to sell over the course of
27 the next several days.

28 Facing overwhelming evidence of their rampant fraud, including smoking gun internal QSI

1 documents confirming that the pipeline was “very weak” and “horrible” at the exact time
2 Defendants were promoting the allegedly rapidly expanding size of the actually decreasing
3 pipeline, and multiple witnesses corroborating Hussein’s testimony that he refrained from selling
4 his stock after hearing and relying on Defendants’ concrete representations, Defendants now appear
5 determined to turn this case into a circus. They propose re-litigating almost every issue already
6 fully litigated and rejected by Judge Brenner at the cross-complaint trial and unanimously affirmed
7 by the Court of Appeal, prejudicing the jury against Hussein due to his wealth, and presenting
8 irrelevant and improper “expert” testimony based on unreliable and non-existent methodology.
9 Once the Court resolves certain key threshold legal issues, this trial will be able to proceed
10 efficiently and remain focused on Hussein’s actual claims, which Hussein expects to establish
11 without any substantial dispute.

12 **II. ORDER OF PRESENTATION AND LENGTH OF TRIAL**

13 This case presents several threshold legal issues that will require the Court’s resolution at
14 the outset of these proceedings. Hussein believes these issues are straightforward, and turn largely
15 on prior rulings or clearly established law (including the CACI instructions) governing claims such
16 as those at issue here. Once the trial begins, Hussein will present his case-in-chief first, followed
17 by Defendants. Hussein estimates the trial will take 6-10 days of court time (assuming 6 hours of
18 trial time per day, and excluding the time necessary to empanel a jury).

19 **III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND TO THE DISPUTE**

20 **A. Hussein suffered severe harm from Defendants’ fraud.**

21 Hussein has been a QSI shareholder since 1982 and served as an independent director of
22 the company from 1999 to 2013, resigning once the full extent of QSI’s frauds (and the rest of the
23 board’s complicity in them) became clear. Hussein was QSI’s second-largest shareholder, holding
24 approximately 15.7% of the Company’s shares before July 2012. In late 2011 and early 2012,
25 Hussein took concrete steps toward selling his entire stake in QSI. He filed a 13D in November
26 2011 and worked closely with Shlomo Cohen, an experienced trader capable of selling his entire
27 substantial block of QSI stock to potentially liquidate his holdings. Mr. Cohen will confirm at trial
28 that he assured Hussein his firm had “enough buy interest to purchase all the shares” if and when

1 Hussein gave the green light to sell. (Tr. Ex. 960.)

2 Hussein ultimately held back from selling after relying on Defendants’ specific factual
3 representations in late 2011 and early 2012 about QSI’s sales pipeline and growth trajectory. As a
4 means of forecasting its future sales, QSI began reporting on the state of its “sales pipeline,”
5 describing it as an objective assessment of how many “new system sales” QSI expected to make in
6 upcoming months. (Tr. Ex. 10.) At the time, QSI was coming off years of strong sales growth driven
7 by the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, which had provided billions of dollars of
8 incentives for healthcare providers to convert to electronic records systems—which QSI sold.
9 Rather than allowing investors to assess the company’s prospects based on historical results, its
10 business plans, and general market conditions, QSI began making statements regarding its sales
11 pipeline and expected future revenue and earnings growth that purportedly were based on a rigorous
12 analysis of objective data.

13 During that time period, at Razin’s direction, Plochocki and QSI made a series of specific
14 factual assertions about QSI’s sales pipeline and earnings expectations that Hussein relied upon in
15 deciding not to sell. For example, on November 7, 2011, when *Investor’s Business Daily* reported
16 that QSI’s announcement of only a 2% increase in its “pipeline of orders . . . from \$170 million to
17 \$173.5 million . . . raised concerns of a flattening growth curve,” Plochocki rebuked those concerns,
18 asserting that “*worries about flattening and saturation were baseless*” and “*there is nothing*
19 *drying up and there is nothing slowing down.*” (Tr. Ex. 2.) Then on January 25, 2012, at a private
20 meeting of QSI’s board that Hussein attended, Plochocki proclaimed that QSI’s then-current
21 growth was “*rivalled only by Apple*” and that QSI expected to achieve *30% revenue and net income*
22 *growth* in its next fiscal year. (Tr. Ex. 3) On an investor call the next day, Plochocki asserted that
23 QSI’s sales “*pipeline continues to build to record levels.*” (Tr. Ex. 4.) In that same call, after stating
24 that he had access to current internal data, another QSI executive stated, “there’s nothing out of
25 character in the pipeline that we’re reporting today versus what we have seen there the past couple
26 of years.” (*Id.*) The very next week, Hussein attended a private dinner with Plochocki in which they
27 discussed how QSI was a company “with some projections that are fantastic” and Plochocki
28 informed Hussein that the Company was doing “great.” (Tr. Ex. 969 at 227-28.)

1 Throughout, QSI and Plochocki concealed the material fact that there was no objective basis
2 for QSI's revenue and earnings projections, and that its sales pipeline was, in fact, receding, not
3 growing. Based on these misrepresentations and omissions, Hussein informed Moe Cohen that he
4 reevaluated his decision to sell his "QSI shares and had instead decided to step back." On February
5 24, 2012, unbeknownst to Hussein, Plochocki sold most of his own QSI shareholdings for \$43.99
6 per share shortly after making the misstatements at issue. (*Id.* Tr. Ex. 64.)

7 Defendants continued making false statements throughout the spring of 2012, which
8 reinforced Hussein's decision not to sell and mitigated a steady decline in the company's stock
9 price between March and June. For example, on May 17, 2012, QSI sought to allay concerns about
10 a disappointing earnings release by falsely claiming it was just a "timing" issue and asserting,
11 without any factual basis (and in contravention to facts known to QSI's in-house financial team),
12 that QSI "remain[ed] confident about the growth opportunities" and "expect[ed] revenues to
13 increase 20 to 24%, earnings per share to grow 20 to 25%." (Tr. Ex. 6.) On June 26, 2012, QSI
14 *again* stated that it was "confident about our growth prospects" and reaffirmed that "[f]or fiscal
15 2013, we expect that revenues will increase in the 20-24% range and we expect earnings per share
16 to grow by 20-25%." (Tr. Ex. 7.) QSI *again* re-affirmed these growth projections on July 13, 2012.
17 (Tr. Ex. 9.)

18 To Hussein's severe detriment, QSI's statements were materially misleading because they
19 omitted the fact that QSI had no objective factual basis for its statements regarding its pipeline and
20 its anticipated range of future revenue and earnings growth. Instead, QSI's internal documents
21 reveal that its pipeline was just "whipped up" to satisfy Defendant Razin's desire to portray a rosy
22 picture to investors, that QSI included in its reported pipeline projected sales even its own finance
23 team admitted internally they had no basis to believe would materialize, and that its forecast was
24 reverse engineered to match management's desired numbers, not based on an objective assessment
25 of likely sales. (*See, e.g.*, Tr. Exs. 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 24, 25.) The falsity became
26 evident just *three days* after QSI's board last publicly verified the false statements in an SEC filing.
27 On July 26, 2012, QSI shocked the market (and Hussein, who had attended the board meeting the
28 evening before, at which there was no mention or discussion of retracting guidance) when

1 Plochocki announced a complete reversal of QSI’s fortunes and ability to project its future growth:
2 QSI’s net income was *decreasing*, its sales pipeline had *evaporated*—not grown, and it was no
3 longer making *any projection at all*. (Tr. Ex. 1.) Without any advance warning to the board, QSI
4 retracted the earnings guidance it had issued (and reaffirmed) in May, June, and just three days
5 earlier, and stated that QSI was “not affirming our previous guidance nor providing revised
6 guidance at this time.” (*Id.*)

7 Although Hussein served on the QSI board, and although Hussein is an experienced
8 investor, he was particularly susceptible to QSI’s frauds because defendant Razin, who effectively
9 controlled the company’s board, excluded him from key information and decision making.
10 Violating the fundamental principle of corporate governance that Hussein was entitled to be treated
11 on an equal basis with Razin—who, as an independent director owned slightly more QSI shares
12 than Hussein and had no greater right to participate in corporate decision making—QSI allowed
13 Razin to manage the company’s strategic planning and day-to-day operations, with Plochocki
14 answering to him. Meanwhile, Hussein, who owned almost as many shares as the rest of the board
15 combined, was the only director excluded altogether from all board committees where the
16 company’s strategic and financial planning took place. Consequently, Hussein had no choice but
17 to rely on QSI management for financial information relating to his investment in the company, as
18 he was entitled to do under Corporations Code § 5231.

19 After Defendants’ false statements became evident, QSI’s stock price, which had been as
20 high as \$44 per share in February and March (before the market began to lose confidence in
21 management with negative financial results that began to trickle out in May), plunged from \$23.63
22 to \$15.95 per share on July 26, 2012, alone. (Tr. Ex. 1279.) Compounding the problem, the
23 company and its board took no action against Plochocki or Razin, who engineered the flagrant
24 fraud, instead choosing to scapegoat Hussein by pursuing baseless claims against him. The
25 precipitous decline in QSI’s stock price caused Hussein hundreds of millions of dollars in damages,
26 including tens of millions sustained when banks that held some of Hussein’s QSI shares in margin
27 accounts liquidated 3.64 million of Hussein’s shares at fire sale prices. (*See Parties’ Joint Fact Stip.*)
28 After QSI’s share price collapsed, Razin spitefully told Hussein he was “delighted for your demise.”

1 (Tr. Ex. 969 at 264:8.) For seven years, rather than acting proactively to restore investor confidence
2 and move the company back onto the successful track it long was on while Hussein was actively
3 involved in management and oversight, QSI has instead devoted its shareholders' equity to
4 attacking Hussein and shielding Plochocki and Razin from the liability that they ultimately must
5 face.

6 **B. Discovery has confirmed QSI's rampant fraud, which will come out at trial.**

7 In discovery, Hussein has uncovered smoking gun evidence of QSI's knowingly fraudulent
8 conduct, including Plochocki's emails establishing that he knew the "pipeline number" would "be
9 the *single most important stat* the analysts will focus on" and that, as a result, QSI executives
10 started "*whipping up the pipeline*" to match analyst expectations. (Tr. Ex. 14.) Internal emails
11 further reveal that QSI's management knew the pipeline was "*horrible*" and "*very weak*" at the
12 exact same time they reported the opposite to the unsuspecting public, including Hussein. (Tr. Exs.
13 141, 149.) The documents even establish that QSI executives fabricated QSI's financial statements
14 from whole cloth to match market expectations, with one member of the finance team conceding:
15 "*I hate to admit it . . . but after hours of playing with the model to make numbers work . . . I gave*
16 *in and made a few plugs to get us to the streets estimate.*" (Tr. Ex. 16.)

17 **C. The Court of Appeal unanimously held that Hussein's evidence of actual and**
18 **justifiable reliance requires trial.**

19 While Judge Schulte initially granted QSI's first summary judgment motion after finding
20 that Hussein could not prove "he reasonably relied on Defendants' alleged misrepresentations," the
21 Court of Appeal *unanimously reversed*. In October 2019, the Court of Appeal held that while QSI
22 "presented what *appeared* to be a strong case for summary judgment by *excerpting* letters Hussein
23 sent" and quoting "*selections* from Hussein's SEC and proxy statement filings," that selective
24 evidence did not establish QSI's argument when considered in its broader context. (ROA No. 1290
25 at 13-14 [emphases added].) While Hussein was deeply critical of fundamental flaws in QSI's
26 corporate governance and lack of transparency—as, of course, was his right and duty as a corporate
27 director—he "did not state any complaint about the accuracy of QSI's financial data or its sales
28 pipeline." (*Id.* at 17). The Court of Appeal further recognized that to satisfy the justifiable reliance
element, Hussein "must show that the reliance was reasonable by showing that . . . the matter was

1 material” (*Id.* at 11.) The Court of Appeal therefore concluded: “Based on such evidence, a
2 jury could infer that the ‘future [QSI] prospects’ contributing to Hussein’s decision to refrain from
3 selling his shares included those based on one or more of QSI’s alleged misrepresentations about
4 QSI’s financial condition and sales pipeline.” (*Id.* at 20).

5 After unanimously losing in the Court of Appeal, Defendants petitioned for rehearing based
6 on their claim that Hussein “has *always* sought damages based on the alleged artificial inflation in
7 QSI’s stock price” and the Court of Appeal “misunderstood” his damages claim and wrongly found
8 it suitable for trial. While *Defendants* have consistently (and wrongly) argued that Hussein’s
9 damages theory depends on “QSI’s stock [being] artificially inflated as a result of the challenged
10 statements,” (ROA No. 394 at 16), the Court of Appeal rejected this argument and correctly made
11 clear that *Hussein does not depend on artificial inflation*. As the Court of Appeal recognized: “It
12 appears defendants attribute to Hussein a premise (QSI’s share price ‘was artificially inflated’) that
13 *by their own briefing they acknowledge he does not share.*” (ROA No. 1290 at 23.) Undeterred,
14 QSI brought its campaign to avoid trial to the California Supreme Court, again claiming the absence
15 of evidence that QSI’s stock price was “artificially inflated” “means those statements must have
16 been immaterial.” The California Supreme Court summarily rejected the petition.

17 **D. QSI’s meritless cross-claim forced Hussein to wait eight years for trial.**

18 Rather than investigate and reform its misconduct, QSI has failed to address its fraud and
19 instead poured tens of millions of dollars into abusive litigation tactics designed to deny or delay
20 justice. Hussein has waited almost *eight* years to put QSI’s fraud before a jury because QSI filed a
21 meritless cross-complaint against him in a transparent effort to delay or deny justice on Hussein’s
22 fraud claims, and then spent many millions of dollars in corporate resources—a substantial portion
23 belonging to Hussein—hopelessly pursuing that cross-complaint through trial and appeal. After
24 QSI presented its case-in-chief, Judge Brenner granted judgment for Hussein, holding that:

- 25 1. Mr. Hussein did not violate his fiduciary duties to QSI.
- 26 2. Between July 27, 2011, to May 14, 2013, Hussein acted in what he believed
27 was QSI’s best interest whether or not other Board members agreed.
- 28 3. Between 2004 and 2012, margin accounts were both lawful and
commonplace among directors of public companies.

- 1 4. There was nothing risky about Mr. Hussein’s activity in placing his QSI
2 stock holdings in margin accounts, and overall, Mr. Hussein lost millions
3 of dollars because of his margin loans.
- 4 5. Nothing about Mr. Hussein margining his QSI stock caused damage to QSI.
- 5 6. Mr. Hussein was not a wrong-doer with regards to the forced sale of his QSI
6 stock in July and August 2012.
- 7 7. The primary cause of QSI’s stock dropping in price on July 26, 2012, was
8 QSI’s earnings report. QSI’s earnings report caused the sale of Hussein’s
9 stock, which resulted in Hussein losing a large amount of money.

10 (ROA No. 1152). Judge Brenner’s holdings were later affirmed by the Court of Appeal, which
11 concluded that QSI’s cross-claim had “no merit.” (*Id.* at 2 [emphasis added].) Notwithstanding its
12 failure at every step in the process, the net effect of QSI’s frivolous breach of fiduciary duty claim
13 against Hussein is that it has cost Hussein millions of dollars to defend (which QSI has refused to
14 indemnify) and successfully denied justice to Hussein for seven years while he overcame every
15 roadblock put in his path.

14 **IV. THRESHOLD LEGAL ISSUES**

15 Judge Brenner totally and completely rejected QSI’s breach of fiduciary duty claim against
16 Hussein after QSI presented its case-in-chief during the cross-compliant trial. The Court of Appeal
17 unanimously affirmed Judge Brenner’s rulings and found QSI’s claim that Hussein breached his
18 fiduciary duties to the Company had “no merit.” (ROA No. 1290 at 2.) Apparently undeterred, and
19 in direct contravention of black letter California law, Defendants nonetheless intend to mislead the
20 jury in this trial by relitigating many of the identical baseless positions this Court (and the Court of
21 Appeal) already rejected. The doctrines of issue preclusion and law of the case both preclude
22 Defendants from injecting into this trial fully litigated positions lacking both evidentiary and legal
23 support. *DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber*, 61 Cal. 4th 813, 824 (2015) (Issue preclusion “prevents
24 relitigation of previously decided issues.”); *Alpha Mech. Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc. v.*
25 *Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am.*, 133 Cal. App. 4th 1319, 1333 (2005) (affirming trial court’s
26 order granting motion *in limine* to preclude defendant “from introducing any of the facts related to
27 [defendant’s] dismissed cross-complaint” because the defendant already “had a full and fair
28 opportunity to litigate its cross-complaint” before the trial on the plaintiff’s complaint).

1 Defendants' improper trial plan touches on all aspects of the trial, including Defendants'
2 proposed jury instructions, verdict form, areas of proffered expert testimony, and motions *in limine*.
3 Accordingly, as a threshold matter the Court should resolve those fully briefed disputes, which will
4 determine the jury instructions, set the framework for allowable evidence and argument before the
5 jury, and dictate the duration of the trial. As a first step in resolving those disputes, the Court may
6 and should judicially notice Judge Brenner's rulings on the fully litigated cross-complaint trial and
7 the Court of Appeal's unanimous opinion affirming Judge Brenner's judgment so that it may
8 instruct the jury regarding the key issues already determined as a matter of law and fact, including:

- 9 - Mr. Hussein did not violate his fiduciary duties to QSI.
- 10 - Between July 27, 2011, to May 14, 2013, Hussein acted in what he believed was QSI's
11 best interest whether or not other Board members agreed.
- 12 - Between 2004 and 2012, margin accounts were both lawful and commonplace among
13 directors of public companies.
- 14 - There was nothing risky about Mr. Hussein's activity in placing his QSI stock holdings
15 in margin accounts, and overall, Mr. Hussein lost millions of dollars because of his
margin loans.
- 16 - Nothing about Mr. Hussein margining his QSI stock caused damage to QSI.
- 17 - Mr. Hussein was not a wrong-doer with regards to the forced sale of his QSI stock in
18 July and August 2012.
- 19 - The primary cause of QSI's stock dropping in price on July 26, 2012, was QSI's
20 earnings report. QSI's earnings report caused the sale of Hussein's stock, which resulted
in Hussein losing a large amount of money.

21 As described in the pending motions, Hussein respectfully submits that the legal and equitable
22 issues raised there are issues for the Court to resolve before empaneling any jury. By ruling on
23 these issues, the Court will dramatically streamline the upcoming trial and keep the parties focused
24 on presenting admissible evidence to the jury that will help the jurors decide this dispute, not
25 Defendants' misleading arguments already found lacking any legal or factual basis. To the extent
26 the Court wishes to hear additional evidence and argument before ruling on any or all of these
27 issues, Hussein is prepared to present such evidence and argument at the Court's request.
28

1 **V. MERITS OF THE CLAIMS**

2 **A. California Law Expressly Authorizes Hussein’s Claims.**

3 Notwithstanding Defendants’ demonstrated propensity to attack the legitimacy of “holder’s
4 claims” under California law, the California Supreme Court has long made clear that there is
5 nothing unique or unusual about Hussein’s claims. To the contrary, in *Small*, the California
6 Supreme Court squarely held that claims such as those at issue here are part of a long history of
7 fraud cases in which defendants’ fraudulent conduct caused plaintiffs to not take action to their
8 detriment. In doing so, the Supreme Court made clear that “California has long acknowledged that
9 if the effect of a misrepresentation is to induce forbearance—to induce persons not to take action—
10 and those persons are damaged as a result, they have a cause of action for fraud.” 30 Cal. 4th at
11 190. There is no “exception to this rule when the forbearance is to refrain from selling stock.” *Id.*
12 In fact, already in these proceedings the Court of Appeal further confirmed the legitimacy of
13 holders’ actions under California law, holding in certain terms: “A shareholder who alleges he
14 refrained from selling shares in reliance on false representations about the company’s financial
15 performance can bring a claim for fraud or misrepresentation under California law.” (ROA No.
16 1290.) Supreme Court precedence and the law of the case should preclude Defendants from
17 advancing any misleading argument to the jury regarding the legitimacy of Hussein’s claims. Given
18 that Hussein’s claims fall squarely within the general line of fraud claims under California law,
19 there’s no reason for the Court to depart from instructing the jury using unmodified CACI series
20 1900 jury instructions regarding fraud or deceit rather than the confusing, inaccurate, extensively
21 modified instructions Defendants have proposed to confuse the issues and mislead the jury.

22 **B. Hussein Relied on Defendants’ Misrepresentations in Holding his QSI Stock.**

23 At trial Hussein will testify that he started seriously considering selling all of his QSI stock
24 in July 2011 after the QSI Board harassed and attacked Hussein by purporting to institute a margin
25 policy targeted directly at him and his personal margin loans. Hussein will explain that over the
26 following six months he had at least twenty conversations with Moe Cohen, an experienced stock
27 trader specializing entirely on liquidating large block trades for highly concentrated individuals like
28 Hussein. Mr. Cohen himself will confirm those meetings, as will Hussein’s secretary Kristy
Walker, who will testify about the more than twenty telephone conversations Hussein had with Mr.

1 Cohen as they worked out the logistics of selling Hussein’s QSI holdings.

2 While undertaking the process to liquidate his holdings, however, Defendants made a series
3 of concrete projections regarding QSI’s short-term growth expectations, which convinced Hussein
4 to step back from selling his stock so that he could benefit from QSI’s robust growth on the horizon.
5 Hussein will explain that he relied on the representations to change his mind about selling his stock,
6 and Mr. Cohen will expressly corroborate Hussein and testify that Hussein informed Cohen that
7 Hussein “reevaluated his decision to sell more than 9 million QSI shares” “based on QSI’s future
8 prospects.” This evidence will establish for the jury that it is more likely true than not true that
9 Hussein would have sold his QSI stock but for Defendants’ concrete misrepresentations about the
10 sales pipeline. In fact, Hussein’s evidence is dramatically more credible and extensive than the
11 Supreme Court, and the Court of Appeal in these proceedings, have found necessary to succeed on
12 a valid holder’s claim:

13 For example, the Supreme Court contemplated that the shareholder may have “told
14 his broker, or a friend, or a spouse, of his decision” to sell his stock. (*Id.* at p. 182.)
15 To illustrate “specific reliance on the defendants’ representations,” the court gave
16 an “example” (*id.* at p. 184) based on the fact that “[a] corporation’s financial report
17 invites shareholders to read and rely on it” (*id.* at p. 182). The court found sufficient
18 a hypothetical allegation “that if”—instead of receiving false financial data—“the
19 plaintiff had read a truthful account of the corporation’s financial status[,] the
20 plaintiff would have sold the stock, how many shares the plaintiff would have sold,
21 and when the sale would have taken place.” (*Id.* at p. 184.)

22 (ROA No. 1290 at 19.) Hussein’s overwhelming, corroborated evidence establishing he was in the
23 process of selling his QSI shares, but reassessed after reviewing and relying upon Defendants’
24 concrete representations about QSI’s future prospects, will persuade the jury that Defendants are
25 responsible for the substantial harm they caused to Hussein in convincing him not to sell his QSI
26 stock when it was worth more than \$400 million.

27 **C. Defendants’ False Statements were Material.**

28 Hussein will introduce abundant evidence of the materiality of QSI’s misrepresentations.
Under California law, a “misrepresentation is judged to be ‘material’ if ‘a reasonable man would
attach importance to its existence or nonexistence in determining his choice of action in the
transaction in question.’” *Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court*, 51 Cal. 4th 310, 332 (2011) (quoting
Engalla, 15 Cal. 4th at 977). Not only would “a reasonable man” find Defendants’ concrete

1 representations material, but Hussein will introduce substantial evidence confirming that even QSI
2 itself contemporaneously agreed that the very statements Hussein relies upon would be important,
3 and thus material, to investors making trading decisions. In an email Plochocki sent on January 11,
4 2012, he asked another QSI executive: “any feel for the pipeline number for our call later this
5 month? **It will be the single most important stat the analysts will focus on.**” (Tr. Ex. 14.
6 [emphasis added].) This explicit admission by Plochocki that a reasonable investor would attach
7 importance to Plochocki’s representations regarding the sales pipeline confirms the materiality of
8 the false statements at issue on its own and beyond any legitimate dispute.

9 Other emails further establish the critical importance of the pipeline numbers for investors,
10 as they indicate that QSI executives manipulated the sales pipeline to appear full and growing. In
11 one email a QSI executive admits QSI was “working to find dollars” to add to the pipeline. (Tr. Ex.
12 30.) When QSI employee Scott Decker reported a newly exaggerated pipeline number shortly
13 before an earnings call, Plochocki’s response starkly showed its importance: “Man . . . you just
14 made my day.” (Tr. Ex. 86.) In another email, Decker wrote: “The pipeline calculation for Inpatient
15 has declined sequentially . . . As you know the street is looking for a growth story. . . I don’t want
16 you to manufacture any data but . . .” (Tr. Ex. 11.) After QSI announced its fiscal 2012 results and
17 growth projections for fiscal 2013, Decker wrote: “We missed the numbers by so much it was
18 material info . . . Putting 2013 guidance out was just as important.” (Tr. Ex. 82.) Another internal
19 email demonstrates that QSI understood QSI’s Board members, like Hussein, would place great
20 significance in any evidence that the sales pipeline was deteriorating: “we really need to understand
21 the downturn in new system sales. It will be a hot subject next week at the Board meeting and the
22 earnings call.” (Tr. Ex. 141.)

23 QSI’s internal recognition of the importance of its misstatements fully aligned with outside
24 investment analysts covering QSI at the time. On January 26, 2012, during the earnings call in
25 which Plochocki publicly misrepresented that QSI’s pipeline “continues to build to record levels,”
26 multiple analysts asked questions about the pipeline. (Tr. Ex. 664, 667.) Hours after the call,
27 analysts at William Blair & Company published a research report stating that “[p]ipeline activity
28 was generally in line with expectations.” (Tr. Ex. 668) Analysts at Caris & Company similarly

1 stated that QSI's "sales pipeline figures provide investors with hope that HCIT adoption wave is
2 far from over." JP Morgan similarly stated: "The ultimate driver of stock movement today is likely
3 to be the pipeline number which provides an indication of the directional strength of the business."
4 These and many similar comments from research analysts establish the materiality of QSI's
5 assurances about its pipeline.

6 When confronted with their statements during their depositions, which will be played before
7 the jury, QSI's witnesses conceded materiality. Asked about his statement that "there is nothing
8 drying up and there is nothing slowing down," Plochocki confirmed that he knew the statement
9 could be published due to its significance:

10 Q. And did you know that that statement would be -- or could be published
11 when you made it?

12 A. We made it at investment banking conferences. We made it on our earnings
13 calls, yes....

14 Q. And you understood that the market could -- or might rely on the statements
15 that you made?

16 A. Yes.

17 (Tr. Ex. 961). Plochocki also testified that he expected the market to rely on the statements made
18 during the Company's January 26, 2012, earnings call:

19 Q. Who were you speaking to on this conference call?

20 A. The -- it's a combination of investors, shareholders, research analysts,
21 typically about 200 people on our -- on our broadcast call for third quarter
22 results.

23 Q. And you expected or understood that the market might rely on the
24 statements that you made during that call, correct?

25 A. Yes.

26 (*Id.* at 73:7-16) When asked about QSI's repeated affirmations of its revenue and earnings guidance
27 in May, June, and July 2012, QSI's General Counsel Jim Sullivan testified under oath at the cross-
28 complaint trial that QSI "expected that shareholders like Mr. Hussein could and would rely on"
those projections. (Tr. Ex. 975) In fact, Mr. Sullivan conceded that he himself relied on Plochocki
and the finance team for the accuracy of those representations because he didn't have the time or
ability to confirm the numbers himself. (*Id.*) This testimony makes clear that QSI always

1 understood the challenged statements were and would be material to the investing public, including
2 Hussein. Indeed, the statements were obviously significant to the SEC, which questioned QSI about
3 its basis for the very “specific projections about the future performance of Quality Systems.” (Tr.
4 Ex. 8.)

5 Given the overwhelming evidence that any reasonable investor would have attached
6 material importance to Defendants’ concrete misrepresentations, Defendants appear poised to argue
7 that the Court should adopt a new and illogical standard that isn’t the law in California (or anywhere
8 else). Rather than focus on whether a reasonable investor would find a misstatement material,
9 Defendants ask this Court to conclude that the real question of materiality is whether a statement
10 has “an effect on QSI’s stock price.” Of course, this is the same theory of materiality that the Court
11 *rejected* last year in denying Defendants’ second summary judgment motion, holding “there is no
12 clear, bright-line rule in [California] that the materiality of a misrepresentation can be judged only
13 by the stock price’s artificial inflation.” (ROA No. 1478.) The Court was correct. No California
14 court has ever held that the definition of “materiality” under California law requires a statement to
15 move a publicly-traded company’s stock price. Instead, California law provides that a “matter is
16 material if a reasonable person would find it important in deciding what to do.” (CACI 1908
17 [Reasonable Reliance].)

18 Even under the federal securities laws, the Ninth Circuit has rejected a *per se* rule under
19 which “if there has been no immediate change in the stock price, the alleged misrepresentations or
20 omissions must have been immaterial.” *No. 84 Employer-Teamster Joint Council Pension Trust*
21 *Fund v. America W. Holding Corp.*, 320 F.3d 920, 934 (9th Cir. 2003). *See also, e.g., Retail*
22 *Wholesale & Dep’t Store Union Local 338 Retirement Fund v. Hewlett-Packard Co.*, 845 F.3d
23 1268, 1277 (9th Cir. 2017) (rejecting the argument that “stock price movements” determine
24 “materiality”). Instead, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that regardless of stock price movements,
25 “[s]urely the materiality of information relating to financial condition, solvency and profitability is
26 not subject to serious challenge.” *United States v. Reyes*, 660 F.3d 454, 469 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting
27 *S.E.C. v. Murphy*, 626 F.2d 633, 653 (9th Cir. 1980)).

28 In *America West Holding Corp.*, the Ninth Circuit explained why a *per se* move-the-market

1 test for materiality does not apply: (1) the “market is subject to distortions that prevent the ideal of
2 a ‘free and open public market’ from occurring”; (2) such “distortions may not be corrected
3 immediately”; and (3) “[b]ecause of these distortions, adoption of a bright-line rule assuming that
4 the stock price will instantly react would fail to address the realities of the market.” *Id.* The court
5 further observed that “although America West’s disclosure of the settlement agreement had no
6 immediate effect on the market price, its stock price dropped 31% on September 3, 1998 when the
7 full economic effects of the settlement agreement and the ongoing maintenance problems were
8 finally disclosed to the market.” *Id.* at 935. The court explained:

9 This reaction, even if slightly delayed, further supports a finding of materiality. This
10 is particularly true because Plaintiffs offer a reason for the delay, i.e., America West
11 continued to reassure analysts that the settlement agreement and compliance
12 therewith would not have noticeable economic effects on the company.

13 *Id.* Numerous other cases are in accord.¹ And the same is true here. Indeed, in the related federal
14 securities class action litigation, the Ninth Circuit held that various QSI statements about its sales
15 pipeline—statements Defendants now contend had no impact on stock price—were materially
16 misleading because they “affirmatively created an impression of a state of affairs that differed in a
17 material way from the one that actually existed.” *In re Quality Systems, Inc. Sec. Litig.*, 865 F.3d
18 1130, 1144 (9th Cir. 2017). The jury will have no doubt that the statements Hussein relied upon to
19 hold his QSI would have been considered important by a reasonable person deciding what to do.

20 **D. Hussein Suffered Substantial Damages from Defendants’ Wrongful Conduct.**

21 Had Hussein gone forward with selling his QSI stock in early 2012 as planned, he would
22 have received more than \$400 million.² By reassessing and deciding not to sell based on
23 Defendants’ misrepresentations and concealment, Hussein suffered tremendous harm. On July 26,

24 ¹ See, e.g., *Nathenson v. Zonagen Inc.*, 267 F.3d 400, 419 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding “if the market
25 believes the company will earn \$1.00 per share and this belief is reflected in the share price, then
26 the share price may well not change when the company reports that it has indeed earned \$1.00 a
27 share even though the report is false in that the company has actually lost money”); *Todd v. STAAR
28 Surgical Co.*, 2017 WL 21662, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2017) (holding a lack of stock price reaction
does not show immateriality when “events do not include any new, unexpected information that
would be expected to affect the stock price”); *In re Sci-Atlanta, Inc. Sec. Litig.*, 571 F. Supp. 2d
1315, 1340-41 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (holding “price stability may just as likely demonstrate the market
consequence of fraud where the alleged fraudulent statement conveys that the company has met
market expectations, when in fact it has not”).

² Plochocki sold 90% of his QSI stock on February 24, 2012, at an average price of \$43.99 per
share. At that same price, Hussein would have received approximately \$410 million.

1 2012, after QSI retracted its earlier guidance, the QSI share price cratered to approximately \$16 per
2 share, leaving Hussein's holdings worth less than \$150 million – a \$250 million decline from
3 February 24, and the proper measure of damages under CACI 1924. In addition to that \$250 million
4 loss, Hussein is further entitled to 7% compounded prejudgment interest for the last eight years.
5 *Michelson v. Hamada*, 29 Cal. App. 4th 1566, 1585-87 (1994). All told, that means Hussein will
6 ask the jury to award more than \$400 million in compensation.

7 **VI. ANTICIPATED EVIDENTIARY PROBLEMS**

8 Once the Court resolves the outstanding motions *in limine* and the additional *Sargon*
9 motions to exclude Defendants' improper proffered expert testimony, Hussein does not anticipate
10 any substantial evidentiary issues with regards to presenting the case.

11 **VII. STIPULATIONS**

12 The parties have submitted to the Court the factual stipulations they have agreed upon. The
13 parties have also submitted to the Court an agreed upon jury questionnaire, joint witness and exhibit
14 lists, and numerous agreed upon jury instructions. Additionally, the parties have agreed to divide
15 trial time equally between the sides, and that subject to the Court's approval, the following time
16 maximum limits will apply:

- 17 - *Voir dire* – 60 minutes per side
- 18 - Opening Statement - 90 minutes per side
- 19 - Closing Statement/Rebuttal – 120 minutes per side

20 **VIII. CONCLUSION**

21 Hussein has waited more than seven years to present his case to a jury of his peers in order
22 to seek recourse for the tremendous harm he suffered. Hussein looks forward to presenting the
23 threshold legal issues to the Court, and finally having the jury deliver him the long overdue justice
24 he deserves.

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Dated: June 29, 2021

SUSMAN GODFREY L.L.P.

By: /s/ *Bryan J. Caforio*

Stephen E. Morrissey
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1 **PROOF OF SERVICE**

2 I, the undersigned, declare:

3 I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not
4 a party to the within action; my business address is 1900 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 1400, Los
Angeles, California 90067-6029.

5 On June 29, 2021, I served the foregoing document(s) described as follows:

6 **PLAINTIFF AHMED D. HUSSEIN'S TRIAL BRIEF**

7 on the interested parties in this action as follows:

8 **SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST**

9 BY MAIL: I am "readily familiar" with the firm's practice of collection and processing
10 correspondence for mailing. Under that practice, it would be deposited with the U.S. Postal Service
11 on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid at Los Angeles, California in the ordinary
course of business. I am aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if
postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing
in affidavit.

12 BY ELECTRONIC MAIL: I caused said documents to be prepared in portable document
13 format (PDF) for e-mailing and served by electronic mail as indicated on the attached service list.

14 BY EXPRESS MAIL

15 BY PERSONAL SERVICE

16 Executed on June 29, 2021, at Los Angeles, California.

17 (State) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the
18 above is true and correct.

19 M. Williams s/ M. Williams
20 (Type or Print Name) (Signature)

SERVICE LIST

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